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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No.

ARTHUR HARDMAN, dba HARDMAN AUTO SALES,
Defendant and Appellant.

8663

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the record.
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in
the trial court.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the third c~se to reach this Court arising out
of the same head-on collision. On December 20, 1954,
plaintiff was driving, and four others were riding, an
automobile in a westerly direction on highway 40, approximately 10 miles west of Salt Lake City when .an
eastbound automobile was driven by defendant Child
on the wrong side of the road and into plaintiff's automobile. Two of the passengers were killed, the other two
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pas.sengers were injured and plaintiff here, George Williams, received very serious personal injuries.
He w,as awarded judgment in the sum of $78,055.17
and it is from this judgment defendant Hardman appeals.
Defendant Child has not appealed.
The liability of defendant Hardman is based upon
the imputation to him of the negligence of defendant
Child on the theory that Child was his servant, or agent,
or they were engaged in a joint venture.
The Statement of Fact.s set forth in the Brief of
Appellant does not adequately reflect the testimony establishing plaintiff's case. An adequate statement is contained in the opinion in Anderson v. Hardman, 313 P.
2d 459 (not yet reported in the Utah reports). This
latter case is the first of this group of cases to come before the Court and it has already been decided. \Ye submit the decision in that case requires an affirmance of
the case now before the Court.
This appeal is based upon the insufficiency of the
evidence to prove the relationship between Child and
I-Iard1nan ,and upon asserted errors in the instructions
regarding that relationship. Defendant Hardman also
contends the damage.s awarded were excessive.
\V e will n1ake such statement of facts as we deem
nece~~.a r~- under the points where they will be pertinent.
\Ve will 1neet each of the points raised by appellant in
the order in which he sets them forth in his brief.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT DEFENDANT CHILD WAS THE AGENT OR
SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR HIS JOINT
VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS LIABLE FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW AND ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT DEFENDANT CHILD WAS THE AGENT OR
SERVANT OF DEFENDANT HARDMAN OR HIS JOINT
VENTURER AND DEFENDANT HARDMAN IS LIABLE FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT CHILD AS A MATTER OF LAW.

The evidence in this case is the same as that presented in Anderson v. Hardman, supra. In the case at bar
it was shown that Hardman was in the used car business
at Sunset, Utah, (123, 124) and that in furtherance of
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this busine.ss he took Child to Tooele to sell him a truck.
Their testimony was again to the effect that they had
agreed that Child was to pay $500.00 on the return to
Sunset and the balance of $150.00 would be paid "in a
short period of time" (138). Both Child and Hardman
contemplated that they would have further documents to
sign. Child testified he knew he was going to sign a
contract, but did not know what it would provide (103).
Hardman testified that there was to be a note and although the note had been mentioned, nothing was said
as to what it would contain. It would be produced for
the first time for Child's perusal at Sunset (138, 139).
Hardman had not delivered the certificate of title nor
bill of sale to Child (126). The certificate of registration had not even been delivered to Hardman so he had
not delivered it to Child (126). It was agreed on all
sides that the trans.action was not to be completed until
they had returned to Sunset (84, 128). On the return trip
the license plates of Hardman were used on the truck
(85).
It was necessary, in furtherance of defendant Hardman's used car bu.siness, to return the truck to Sunset
to complete the ultimate purpose of that business to wit:
the sale of the truck. He was taking another car back on
his wrecker and he requested Child to drive the truck
to Sunset ( 87). HardJ.nan also suggested that they pass
each other on the w.ay back so they could keep in touch
with one another (~7, 88). As .a 1natter of fact, Child was
passing Hardman in con1pliance with this suggestion at
the time the collision occurred.
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All of the foregoing facts are uncontroverted and
undisputed. We submit that this Court in the Anderson
case held that the responsibility of Hardman for the
negligence of Child was established as a matter of law.
This Court therein said:
"There is no substantial conflict in the evidence ; and the facts concerning the relation between Hardman .and Child are uncontroverted.
The question is what conclusion of law must be
drawn from the evidence."
This Court then held that title had not passed from
Hardman to Child and in going from Tooele to Sun.set
they were acting in furtherance of Hardman's business
in completing the sale of the truck. l-Ienee Child's negligence was imputed to Hardman.
The uncontroverted evidence establishes this relationship and therefore it is not necessary to look to the
in.structions. The trial court should have instructed as a
matter of law that Hardman was responsible for the
negligence of Child.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW AND ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED
THE JURY ON ALL MATERIAL ISSUES.

As stated .above, we do not believe the Court need
consider these instructions but in order to make a complete answer to appellant's brief we wiH consider each of
the contentions he makes with respect to the claimed
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error_s in the instructions given by the court. Defendant
does not contend that any requested instruction not
given should have been given.
Defendant contends that his theory was not properly
presented. He also contends that the repetition of the
instructions concerning the issue of ma.ster and servant
was prejudicial. It is difficult to understand how his
theory could not have been presented and at the same
time was presented to the point that it was prejudicially
repetitious.
Instruction No. 1 purported to set forth the contentions of the parties and cannot be considered an instruction setting forth the elements necessary for plaintiff to prove in order that the jury might return a verdict
in his favor. The issue of agency ·was thoroughly and
completely covered in the instructions and plaintiff was
required by the instructions to prove this issue. Defendant Hardinan answers his own criticism of this instruction when he refers to the court's instruction No. 2.
In that instruction the court specifically states the burden
of proof is upon plaintiff to prove that Child was negligent and in order to recover against defendant Hardman,
plaintiff had the burden of proof to _show that Child was
negligent and that the relationship between Hardman and
Child was that of principal and agent, or master and
servant, or joint venturers (-!6).
Further exploring the contention of defendant Hardman rr>garding failure to set forth his theory it should be
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noted that the jury were instructed concerning the relationship between Child and Hardman in seven instructions. Three of these instructions were tho.se requested
by defendant Hardman. Two were requested by plaintiff and two were prepared by the court. Defendant
Hardman's requested instructions 7 (33), 9 (35) and
13 (39) were given in substance in the court's instructions
7 (51), 9 (53) and 6 (50) respectively. Comparison and
review of the.se instructions wiH show that all phases
of defendant Hardman's theory was pre'sented to the
jury, including that of right of control. See Instructions
No. 6 (50) 9 (53) and 11 (55) .
Another startling contention of defendant is that
there should be a reversal because the trial court gave
instruction No. 6 (50). Instruction No. 6 is defendant
Hardman's requested instruction No. 13 (39) and it is
that requested instruction, word for word, even including
the italicized portion of the instruction set forth on Page
8 of appellant's brief.
Defendant contends there was no evidence to justify
submission of the case to the jury on the theory of master
and .servant or joint venture. We submit that Anderson
v. Hardman, supra, has foreclosed any such argument as
this.
We respectfully submit that Child's neglect should
be imputed to Hardman as a matter of law and hence
we need not consider any claimed error in these instructions. However, even though we do give conscientious
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con.sideration to these instructions it at once becomes apparent that the jury was completely and adequately instructed on the law defining the relationship between
Hardman and Child and no error was committed in this
regard.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND DOES NOT
APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION OR PREJUDICE.

Under this point defendant makes the bald contention that the verdict is excessive and appears to have
been given under the influence of passion and prejudice.
He does not undertake to discuss or analyze the facts.
There is good reason why he did not. It is apparent
that if he had done so, it would appear without question
that this contention would fall of its own weight.
Defendant complains of the failure to give defendant's requested instruction concerning passion, prejudice and syrnpathy. The trial court did instruct on this
subject as follows (64):
''Yon should consider all the evidence impartially, fairly and without prejudice of any kind,
and from such consideration, in connection with
the instructions giYen you by the court, you should
reach such a Yerdict as will do justice between the
parties."
\Ve sub1nit the burden is upon appellant to establish
that the verdict is exressiYe. He has not attempted to
di::.;ellarge that burden. \Yith but two pages of his brief
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9
devoted to this subject and with no discussion of the
facts, we cannot believe him to be serious in this contention. Even though defendant does not discuss the facts,
we will do so to complete'ly put at rest any question about
the amount of this verdict.
We believe it will be helpful to review a few of the
authorities which define the role the appellate court plays
in the review of the contention that damages are excessive.
In our jurisprudence the jury has been selected as the
tribunal to fix damages. The trial court has a discretion to exercise in passing upon the amount of the verdict.
The question of damages w,as presented to the trial court
by defendant's Motion for a New Trial (66, 67). This
motion was overruled ( 68). The trial court there by
placed his stamp of approval upon the amount of the
verdict. This approval is given great weight by appellate
courts and very rarely is such approval overruled.
The importance of this approval has been recognized
by this Court in Stephens Ranch & Live Stock Co. v.
Union Pac. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459, wherein it
was stated:
"Necessarily upon such a question appellate
courts must, to a large extent, rely upon the judgment and discretion of the trial court. That court
is in a much better position to observe and determine whether a jury was actuated by passion or
prejudice, or by both, in returning a verdict for
an amount larger than the evidence justifies, or
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whether the jury was merely mistaken with regard to the amount that should have been allowed."
In Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah 340, 255 P. 416 the Court
stated:

"*** in ease of doubt, the deliberate action
of the trial court should prevail. Otherwise this
court will sooner or later find itself usurping the
functions of both the jury and the trial court."
See also Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759
(1954).
After the trial court has approved the amount of the
verdict, the appellate court only reviews the ruling on
the basis of whether the trial court has abused its discretion. It was so held in Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande
R. Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 Pac. 1185, wherein the Court
stated:
"Still that court, in such particular, is not
supreme or beyond reach. Its action may nevertheless be inquired into and reviewed on an alleged abuse of discretion, or a capricious or arbitrary exercise of power in such respect. Such a
review is not a review of a question of fact, but
of law. A ruling granting or refusing a motion
for a new trial is certainly reviewable when the
proceedings with respect to it are properly preserved and presented. That has not been questioned. Of course the ruling will not be disturbed
on evidence in conflict or on matters involving
discretion. Yet our power to eorrect a plain abuse
of discretion or undo a mere capricious or arbitrary exercise of power cannot be doubted."
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Neither this Court nor the trial court should set its
opinion against the opinion of the jury. To do so would
but usurp the function of the jury. In the Jensen case
this Court stated:
"Neither is either party on that question entitled to the judgment of the court below in a case
of tort tried to a jury. Both parties, as to that,
are entitled to the unprejudiced judgment of the
jury. That is exclusively within their province.
Their power and discretion, when properly exercised and when they have been properly directed
as to the measure of damages and the mode of assessing it, may not be interfered with merely because the court above or below may think the
amount rendered is too large, or even may think
it appears to be larger than the evidence apparently or fairly justifies. A court, vacating a verdict
and granting a new trial by merely setting up his
opinion or judgment against that of the jury, but
usurps judicial power and prostitutes the constitutional trial by jury."
The case most widely cited as laying down the proper
rule to be followed by an appellate court is the case of
Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. 45, where Chancellor
Kent stated:

"*** The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to
have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be
flagrantly outrageous, and extravagant, or the
court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they
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have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.
(Oleveland, etc. Co. v. Hadley, 170 Ind. 204, 82
N.E. 1025, 84 N.E. 13, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 535, 16
Ann. Cas. 1; 15 Am. Jr., p. 623.)"
This Court has also had occasion to address itself
to this problem in Pauly v. il1cCarthy, 109 Utah 431, 184
P. 2d 123 (1947). Most of the earlier Utah cases were
cited and the rule was expressed .as follows:
"Since the Jensen case above quoted, it is well
settled that this court has power to, and will, consider assignments of error based on excessive verdicts. (cases cited) But, although we have the
power to order a new trial in case of an excessive
verdict, it is a power which we have rarely, if
ever, exercised. However, in the case of Shepard
v. Payne, supra, we ordered a remission of $2,500
from a $10,000 verdict. In that case, the excess
was not the re.sult of passion or prejudice, but was
determinable as a matter of law.
"Where we can say, as a n1atter of law. that
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice, and the trial court abused its discretion or
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a motion for new trial, we 1nay order the \erdiet set
aside and .a new trial granted. Jensen Y. Den\er &
R.G.R. Co., supra: and other cases cited aboYe follo·wing- that decision. But 1nere excessiveness of a
verdid, without 1nore. does not necessarily show
that the verdict was arriYed at by passion or prejudiee. Stephens Ranch & LiYe.stock Co. Y. Fnion
Par. R. Co., supra. It is true that the verdict
might be so grossly excessive .and disproportionate
to the injury that we could say frmn that fact
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alone that as a matter of law the verdict must have
been arrived at by passion or prejudice. But the
facts mu.st be such that the excess can be determined as .a matter of law, or the verdict must be
so excessive as to be shocking to one's conscience
and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury. McAfee v. Ogden
Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; \Yard v. Denver
& R. G. W. R. Co., supra. This is not such a case.
"The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But
the mere fact that it was more than another jury,
or more than this court, might have given, or even
more than the evidence justified, does not conclusively show that it was the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the jury."

*

* *

"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v.
Southern Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The
present cost of living and the diminished purchasing power of the dollar may be taken into consideration when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby,
57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union
Ry. & Depot Co., supra.
"We can discover nothing in this ca.se, except
the amount of the verdict, which indicates passion
or prejudice, .and, as we have seen, passion and
prejudice are not necessarily inferred from an
excessive verdict, without more. No exception was
taken to the jury or any member thereof. No
conduct on the part of the jury, evincing pas_sion
and prejudice, has been. ca~led to . our atten~ion.
The only point of complaint IS the size of verdict."
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The last paragraph quoted is particularly applicable
here because no exception or objection was leveled at the
jury or any member thereof or at any conduct of the jury.
Defendant relies solely upon the amount of the verdict.
To show how sparingly and with what hesitancy this
power should be invoked we point to the fact that this
Court has never set aside a verdict on this ground. The
Court recognized the fact in Ladder v. Western Pacific
R. Co., 259 P. 2d 589 (Not yet officially reported in the
Utah reports) (1953) where it was stated:
"But we find no case where this oourt has
held that as matter of law passion and prejudice
were shown merely by the excessive amount of
the verdict *** ."
With these rules in mind let us now turn to the evidence presented in the case at bar.
The jury returned .a verdict of $78,055.17. This consisted of general damages in the an1ount of $70,000.00
and special damages in the sun1 of $8,055.17. These special damages 1nay be further broken down a.s follows:
Hospital expenses ------------------------------------$5,406.32
Doctors' bills ---------------------------------------------- 2,624.00
Ambulance --------------------------------------------------

2-!.85

Total ---------------------------------------------~------$8,055.17
Counsel states that this verdict is unreasonably high
1n comparison with other verdicts in this jurisdiction.
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While we have been following rather closely for a number of years the verdicts for injuries in this and other
jurisdictions, we confidently assert that so far as this
jurisdiction is concerned, the injuries suffered by plaintiff were worse than any we have ever encountered. The
injuries suffered by plaintiff are both tremendous .and
frightful. The amount of the verdict pales into insignificance when it is compared with these injuries.
Mr. Williams was the driver of the automobile and
was on the left side, which side apparently sustained the
brunt of the impact. At the time of trial, twenty-six
months after the accident, plaintiff was in a cast incasing
both legs and both hips and was still being hospitalized.
It appeared further hospitalization would be necessary.
Bony union had not been effected in his left leg, his right
arm was useless.
A mere recapitulation of the injuries sustained by
him shows their aggravated character.
The collision occurred December 20, 1954, shortly
after 4:00 o'clock p.m. Dr. Marion B. Noyes first saw
plaintiff at approximately 8 :00 p.m. on that day at the
County Hospital (151). At the time he arrived, the medical staff at the County Hospital was treating plaintiff
for shock.
Plaintiff was suffering from acute shock; there was
a scalp laceration going clear across his forehead; there
were multiple cuts, abrasions and hematose contusions.
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He had a badly comminuted fracture with abnormal displacement at the upper end of his left femur; he had a
fractured right arm and a fractured right leg. This latter
fracture went into the tibial plateau, which is the top
of the tibia and the weight bearing portion of that joint.
He was also suffering from a concussion of the brain
and was unconscious. The cut across the forehead was
described as "ragged and dirty." He also had a cut ear
and in the area of his neck he had many cuts, ecchymosis,
black and blue spots, and hematose collection of the blood
underneath the skin. The 8th, 9th and lOth ribs had been
fractured .and the lung punctured, letting air into the
chest cavity. After transfusions of blood and saline
transfusions and IB fluids, he was taken to the LDS
I-Iospital (151, 152).
After arriving at this hospital they continued to
treat him for shock. It was impossible to give the fractures adequate treatment because of his condition and, as
the Doctor stat,ed, it would do no good to fix the fractures
if it killed the patient.
The doctor was unable to start any active treatment
of the fractures until Decmnber 31, 1954 (160).
We will take each of the injuries and conditions
and delineate in detail the extent of the injury, the treatment given and the result obtained.
The following is a list of the ti1ne spent by plaintiff
in the lw~pital fr01n the date of the collision to the date
of trial:
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l.
~.

3.

4:.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Dates
No. of Days
Dec. 20, 1954 to April 17, 1955 ________________ 118
Aug. 13, 1955 to Aug. 20, 1955____________________ 7¥2
Oct. 5, 1955 to Oct. 7, 1955__________________________ 3
Nov. 18, 1955 to Dec. 10, 1955____________________ 22
Feb. 20, 1956 to Mar. 11, 1956 ____________________ 20
l\1ar. 26, 1956 to Apr. 3, 1956____________________ 8
July 14, 1956 to July 28, 1956__________________ 14
Jan. 5, 1957 to Jan. 7, 1957________________________ 3
J.an. 14, 1957 to F·eb. 14, 1957--------------------~
TotaL _______________________ 2241f2

In considering the above and also in considering the
detailed statement of injuries to follow, the Court should
have in mind two of the elements of damages recoverable
in a personal injury case. Plaintiff is entitled to recover
for the mental .and physical pain and suffering which he
has endured and which he may probably endure in the
future. Also he is entitled to recover for loss of bodily
function in the past and for the loss of bodily function he
may probably suffer in the future. Picino v. Utah Apex
Mining Co., 52 Utah 338, 173 P. 900.
SHOCK
The injuries suffered by plaintiff caused him to
suff·er shock (151). This condition was considered acute.
The Doctor stated: "In f.act we treated him all that
night; it took a lot of heroic treatment to keep him from
expiring." This wa.s treated by blood transfusions, saline
transfusion, IB fluids and oxygen. It was not until the
31st of December that his condition of shock was such
that they could start to actively treat some of the very
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serious injuries plaintiff had sustained in the collision.
(152, 153). For at le.ast two nights he was about to expire
(153).
LACERATIONS
There were many lacerations, cuts and bruises and
particularly the laceration that went across the forehead (151). These wounds were cleaned out and the
neces.sary treatment given to them.
FRACTURE OF LEFT

FE}.f{;~

This is and the fracture of the right arm are the
most serious injuries sustained by plaintiff. In describing the injury as shown by X-rays of December 27 the
doctor testified (157) :
"Now, the fracture of the left femur was
high, it was an especially bad fracture. This is
in the splint and this is the ring you can see
hanging down, it shows not only a comminution,
broken across, it is splintered up and down and
fragmented - which shows a large intervening
fragment, which in itself complicate.s the fracture
and the outlet for the fracture."
In referring to an X-ray taken on Decen1ber 20th,
the doctor stated as follows (157, 158):
"It shows the lesser trochanter, the musc.Ies
attached are loose.
"Here is another one, the sa1ne night. That
shows even more so, if you want to see these.
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"Thi.s is the upper part of the left femur,
this is what we call the upper fragment, the upper
broken part, the main shaft is below, and this
is the large piece intervening-it was knocked
loose, it was not only broken once, it was broken
twice .and up and down this way, and it shows a
bad position.
"You have got to get these bones together,
get them in position when they are in that condition.
"In other word.s, it is a very badly comminuted fracture."
Immediately after he arrived at the L.D.S. Hospital the doctor put plaintiff's left leg in traction (160).
On December 31st an open reduction of the fracture
was attempted. It consisted of making an incision in
the leg, cutting to the bone, reducing the fracture and
immobilizing it (160). In order to immobilize the fracture they performed an operation which the doctor
called Intra Medullary nail pinning. It was necessary
after this operation to apply a cast to both legs (160).
\Ve will tre.at of the fracture to the right leg hereinafter.
On January 7, 1956 the cast was changed (165).
By August of 1956 it was discovered there was evidence
of osteomyelitis or low grade infection in the fractured
femur. To attempt to cure this was the purpose of two
visits to the hospital. The doctor explained how this
infection could come from a sequestration of dead bone.
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Pieces of bone lose their blood supply in case.s of fractures of this kind and they become dead. The body attempts to throw them off and they cause an irritant (168).
Finally on February 22, 1956 it became necessary
to perform another open operation (175). The doctor performed what is called a sequestrectomy. At that time
the dead bone was removed. The doctor also testified:
"*** we saucerized, which means cleaning out the space
for the osteomyelitis." Also at this time a bone graft
was performed in an attempt to promote the healing.
The bone was taken from the illiac crest of the hip bone
and placed in the fracture site. Still later on plaintiff
developed an abscess high on the thigh, which caused
fever. The doctor testified that they put plaintiff to
sleep and did an ·open drainage of the abscess (176).
In July of 1956 an x-ray still showed some dead
pieces of bone in the left leg. Another open operation
w.as performed which the doctor called "open drainage.''
The pieces of dead bone were re1noved and drainage
put in to take care of the infection (176).
On January 15, 1957. the Intra :Jiedullary nail was
removed and s1nall pieces of dead bone were cleaned
out of the leg. At that tilne the doctors believed there
was .a solid bony union, although it was 1nade up of
rather poor bone. They provided hin1 with what is known
as a Calver brace to ~upport the leg. Following the removal of the pin he again developed pain and soreness,
P~peeially on nwve1nent. They re-exercised the leg and
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found the fracture had not healed. More deformity had
occurred, so it w.as necessary to again put plaintiff in
a cast. The cast was put on January 29, 1957. It included the entire left leg and across the abdomen to
the right leg. The purpose of this was to immobilize
the leg, to give it a chance to heal (177, 178).
The doctor testified concerning the condition of
this left leg at the time of trial. There was still osteomyelitis present and he believed it would be present
for an indefinite time. He could not tell the dur.ation of
this osteomyelitis, but stated that it has been known
to go from twenty to thirty years and varies from a
short to a long time. He gave his opinion that so far as
plaintiff is concerned, it will go for quite .a long while
(176, 177).
He explained how osteomyelitis involves the bone
and eats it out, preventing it from properly healing
and causes a moth-eaten appearance and loss of the
bone substance. It causes an inf·ection of the bone itself
(177).
There had been no union of the fractured bone of
the left leg. Another pin had been placed in the leg.
The doctor testified that it would have to stay in indefinitely and there was considerable doubt as to the
healing of this bone. The doctor testified that he would
very likely have to do further bone grafting to try .and
promote the healing (180). He testified that this leg
was not as good as it was on September 2, 1956 (181).
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In making a prognosis of the condition found in
the left leg, the doctor testified that based on the slowness of the healing, there would be a long protracted
course and it might po_ssibly heal. He testified he wa::;
going to give it a chance for a matter of months. If it
did not heal, he would have to go in and help it with
bone grafts (183). He testified that he figured the cast
would have to remain on from four to six months and
after a reasonable length of time if there was no healing,
it would be necessary to again operate and perform a
bone graft and then, of course, plaintiff would have
to go back in the cast again (184).
He testified very definitely that there \vould be a
permanent disability in this left leg (184).

FRACTURED RIGHT ARli
The humerus bone of the right arm was fractured.
This area is between the elbow and shoulder. There
was comminution, that is, the break was not straight
across, but was jagged and there was displacement (155).
A cast was put on the arn1 (152). This ·was lmown a~
a hanging cast and ordinarily they can hold the weight
down and set the frarture; howeYei'. plaintiff had to
lie in bed and the cast did not work too well (15G).
They could not get the bones in the proper position
so it was necessary to later go in and put a plate on
the bone ( 156).
In spite of the cast and manipulations, the humerus
ju.st would not stay in place. On January 25th he had
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an open reduction of this fracture with fixations with
vitallium plate and screws and supporting cast (165,
166).
On April 14th there was a reapplication of the cast
to the right arm. Of course, there were antibiotics .and
blood transfusions and all the treatment ordinarily done
for fractures.
On November 25, 1955, the right humerus had
failed to heal during the protracted period of tre.atment.
The doctor removed the plate and screws, then bone
grafted it and in.serted .a Rush nail, a particular type of
intermediary nail. It was put in the inside of the bone.
The purpose was to form an internal fixation or support
to the fracture site in order to hold the bones in place
to implement healing and to correct alignment (174).
The bone graft was accomplished by taking bone fron1
other portions of the body and inserting them around
the fracture site (174).
On December 7th a cast was put on plaintiff's right
arm, shoulder and chest for the purpose of giving support in addition to that afforded by the internal nail
(175). The bone had seemed to be healing with bony
union, but with obvious defects (180). From the X-ray
taken January 7, 1957, it appeared that the union was
fairly good, but there was a defect and considerable
doubt about its healing. This indicated that the pin
would still have to stay indefinitely and it was very
likely the doctor would have to do further bone grafting
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in an attempt to heal the fracture site. He stated that
the outlook on this was indefinite. He also testified that
the arm in January of 1957 was not in as good a shape
as it had been in September of 1956 (181).
In answering the question concerning the prognosis
of the arm, the doctor testified that it was going to
require a long time of fixation and probable bone grafting .and he concluded, "But I would sa:T he is in for a
long time on that.'' He gave his opinion that plaintiff
had suffered a permanent disability to his right arm
(185).

FRACTURED RIGHT LEG
Immediately after the collision no active treatment
could be given this fracture. The leg was placed in a
pillow splint (152). X-rays were taken and disclosed
there was a fracture line on the tibia extending into
the knee joint and into ·what is called the tibial plateau.
This was onto the weight-bearing surface where the
femur bears the "·eight onto the lower bones of the
leg. There was a downward displacen1ent (151, 158).
On Dece1nber 31st casts were put on this right leg
along with the cast on the left leg. This was known as
a pelvic cast. Reduction of the fracture in the right
knee "·a~ first aeeomplished. In order to do this, two
large transverse screws were placed in the tibia. This
is dmw to hold the bone .and also to giYe stability to
the wobbly joint (162).
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The cast was changed on January 7, 1955 (165).
This fracture still has screws in it, but the doctor testified he was of the opinion he had obtained an excellent
re,sult so far a.s the knee was concerned and that it was
healed. He testified that he did not anticipate anything
further fron1 this knee, but eventually if anything should
kick up or cause disturbance, it might be necessary to
remove the screws (184).
FRACTURED RIBS AND LUNG PUNCTURE
Ribs 8, 9 and 10 were fractured. The lung was punctured and let out air into his chest. This is known a.s
a pneumothorax (153). Such an injury embraces the
respiratory system and requires constant observation.
Air is let out into the lung cavity and the lung collapses
(159).
CONCUSSION OF THE BRAIN
Plaintiff received a concussion of the brain. He
was uncon.scious when he was brought into the hospital
(151). On December 31st he could talk a little bit but he
was not oriented at all to time, place, position, or the
nature of his injury (153). At the time of trial, twentysix months later, he was still suffering from a confusion
of the brain (186) .
MULTIPLE INJURIES
Each of the foregoing injuries was serious in and
of itself. Particularly is this true of the fractures and
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the concussion. Even to take them individually, without
their overall effect, would certainly justify the verdict
which was rendered. However, the multiple nature of
these injuries has taken its toll on plaintiff's health
and have sapped his vitality and energy. The doctor
testified concerning this situation ( 185) :
"Well, multiple, seriou_s injuries in anybody
causes a great deal of trouble with what we call
stress and syndrome. It is hard on the nervous
system and hard on the health of the individual.
They are notoriously apt to form complications
and apt to be slow in healing. When the body has
many injuries to take care of it has to divide it
up among many healing area.s. These areas of
disease and deformity acts as areas of lower resistance and infections and what not are more apt
to lodge in them. From what complications are
apt to develop it is always, as a rule, a long case,
especially in a man that is older. A real young
individual might heal considerably faster but anybody who has as many injuries as this man has
is bound to have a long time."
And again (186) :
"What we have is what we call stress Syndrome, which is quite popular since Dr. Saley
has brought it out. But it adds up to if :~ou put
any individual through enough strain and enough
injury it is going to tax his systen1. It is bound
to do it, no 1natter who he is. That was well
proved in the wars and in the serious protracted
illnesses and so forth. In addition this man had
confusion of the brain which hasn't been mentioned very 1nuch. And so by a con1bination of
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the confusion of the brain plus multiple injuries
he has reason for having an upset of his whole
system."
The doctor opined that plaintiff would never be
able to work again (185). He elaborated upon this on
cross examination by stating that he was sure he would
not be able to handle the type of work he had been
doing at the time of the collision and that he would
not be able to handle a shovel as he had done or any
hard manual work with a had leg and a bad arm, and
then (189) :

"Q. Yes. But so far as any other type of
more sedentary work why you wouldn't know
about that at this time, would you~
A. Well, I couldn't say whether he could do
a sitting job of an easy type. He might be able
to if he is qualified for it."
The testimony established that plaintiff had only
performed work which entailed manual labor. He was
not qualified to do any kind of a sitting job and just
what a "sitting job" is, is not disclosed.
In Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 196 P. 2d
968, this Court in denying the contention there was no
permanent impairment of earning capacity and in answer to a contention that the injured person there could
hold a "sitting job," the Court stated:
"It ·should be noted here that plaintiff w,a8
not trained or qualified to engage in any other
. f u I occupat'1on. "
ga1n
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The testimony further showed that plaintiff was
fifty-six year_s of age at the time of the collision and
fifty-eight at the time of trial. The person who took
his job in 1955 received the sum of $5100.00 ( 106), there
having been an increase in salary.
There are eight separate and distinct elements of
damages:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Lo_st earnings
Impaired earning capacity
Past physical p.ain
Future physical pain
Past mental suffering
Future mental suffering
Past loss of bodily function
Future loss of bodily function

\V e believe that the amount of this verdict should
be sustained upon the first two items alone. Twentysix months had elapsed fr01n the date of injury until
the date of the trial. At $5,100.00 per ye.ar this amounts
to $11,050.00. If he had continued to work full time until
sixty-five, that would be an additional seven years or
$35,000.00. If he then were giYen credit for one-half
such wages for the balance of his life expectancy (17.05
yean; at date of trial) .another $25,000.00 would be added
making a total of $71,050.00.
""\Ylwn compared with the Yerdict rendered in
Scldallcr Y. illcCartll,lf. 113 Utah 5-ti. 196 P. ~d 968;
113 lTtah 560, 19S P. ~d 573, the verdict here is small.
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In that case the verdict was for $41,212.44 plus specials.
There plaintiff was .sixty-one years of age when injured,
trial was thirteen months after the injury and there was
no bony union in his right leg which had been fractured
in two places between the knee and ankle. At the time
of trial the osteomylitis was quiescent and apparently
healed. The doctor testified plaintiff could return to
work two .and one-half years after the trial or a total
of three and one-half years after the injury.
In the case at bar we have a man fifty-six years
of age at the time of injury, fractures of the left femur,
right leg, right arm and other injuries. There was no
bony union in the left leg after twenty-six months .and
osteomylitis was still present. The right arm was useless.
The doctor here testified he would never be able to
return to work.
We submit that in comparison with the Schlatter case
the evidence here establishes more than twice the damages there allowed and approved.
This Court sustained a $70,000.00 verdict in Bennett
v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 117 Utah 57,
213 P. 2d 325. There plaintiff was younger and only the
right arm was affected. He had lost this .arm. Here a
leg and an arm were useless and there were multiple injuries as above described. Here the damages were
greater than in the Bennett case.
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When we detail the past suffering to which plaintiff has been subjected, the numerous trips to the hospital and many operations, it becomes apparent a very
large and substantial figure would be required to compensate him. His future is indeed dark. He was still in
the hospital at the time of trial and could look forward
to more operations and more hospitalizations. His right
arm was still useles.s as well as his left leg.
Plaintiff is entitled to recover for both mental and
physical pain and suffering. Think of the mental suffering to which he has been subjected and the contemplation he must have of living a life as a cripple.
In our judgment $50,000 would be a modest sum
for the last six elements above enumerated. To be added
to this are his lost earnings and impainnent of earning
capacity which would put the amount supported well
over the $70,000 awarded.
We submit the verdict here is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence.
CONCLUSIOX
We have in this ease a fifty-eight year old man
who probably will be totally incapacitated fron1 working
the rest of his life. He suffered yery serious injuries
and for two days was expected to die. He has suffered
permanent disability to both his left leg and right arm.
At the time of the injury he was a shoYel operator and
the year following his injury the person who took hi::;
job reeeived $5,100.00. Now plaintiff can earn nothing.
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This injury occurred to him while Child and Hardman were in furtherance of Hardman's used car business
and the jury returned a verdict against both Hardman
and Child. We submit the relationship of principal and
agent or master and servant or joint venturer was made
out as a matter of law. In any event, the jury was fully
instructed on all issues in the case, .and found for plaintiff.
We respectfully submit that the judgment in favor of
plaintiff should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK

By Brigham E. Roberts
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
By Leonard W. Elton
Counsel for Respondent
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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